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Abstract 
This paper analyzes empirically the value - as measured by patent citations - of a set of 1363 
essential patents belonging to 9 different patent pools. We find that pooled patents receive 
more cites than control patents having the same characteristics but not included in a pool. This 
difference stems only partly from the pools’ ability to select the most cited patents. Indeed we 
show that being included in a pool also tends to increase the value of patents. This induced 
effect reflects the incentive for patent owners to join a pool. We analyze it in details in order 
to better understand the drivers of enhanced patent value. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The first patent pool appeared in the early 19th century but these organizations become again a 
major topic of discussion lately especially in the telecommunications sector. A patent pool is 
an agreement between patent owners in order to grant a single license for more than one patent. 
Patent pools could help to reduce the patent thicket problem. A patent thicket is a “dense web 
of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order 
to actually commercialize new technology” (Shapiro, 2001). This problem of patent thicket is 
particularly true for economic sectors such as telecommunications. Patent pools could help to 
reduce this problem by reducing the number of licenses that a company wishing to use a new 
technology must sign.  
 
The litterature generally identifies two main economic benefits of patent pools. They reduce 
the transaction costs by decreasing the number of licenses needed to use a technology. They 
avoid or reduce the multiple marginalization problem. The multiple marginalization concept, 
first defined by Cournot (1838), was adapted to intellectual property by Shapiro (2001) 
indicating that the total amount of royalties, for a technology, claimed by patent owners of 
complementary patents will be too high and therefore may reduce the standards’ diffusion.  
This also implies that patent owners could increase their revenues by coordinating their 
licensing behaviours. There are two known solutions for this multiple marginalization problem. 
One of them is the concentration of patent owners through mergers or acquisitions. The other 
one, which seems more realistic, is the gathering of patent owners through patent pools. From a 
global perspective, the creation of a pool is beneficial for the dissemination of the technology.  
 
But, in practice, problems related to pools creation and stability are important issues. Indeed, 
patent holders have strong incentives not to participate to the pool in order to free ride by 
taking advantages of the opportunity to charge higher royalties for their patents (Aoki & 
Nagaoka, 2004).  The aim of this paper is to analyze a possible incentive for patent holders to 
participate in a pool. In fact, one advantage of the pool may be to “strengthen” the patents. 
After introduction, patents are considered as essential for the dissemination of the technology 
and consequently can not be circumvented. It is, for instance, much easier for the patent holder 
to enforce its patent rights after introduction in a pool. This incentive, for patent holders, is a 
new research path almost unexplored in the litterature. Only, the International 
Telecommunications Standards User Group (1998) stressed that : “[…] when a patent is 
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essential to a standard, it is converted into the equivalent of a ‘master patent’, even if it covers 
a relatively minor and unimportant innovation”.  
 
This paper analyzes the possible link between value and essentiality. The debate beyond 
patents’ value in pools is to determine if patents are of better value when they are introduced or 
if the patents submitted are of lesser value initally but the pool reenforce them. We will use the 
patent number of citations as a proxy of the patents’ value. We will analyze if patents 
incorporated in pools generally receive more citations. We will identify the part of patent 
citations coming from the “intrinsinc value” effect (the pool selects patents with more 
citations) or from the “induced value” effect (when a patent is introduced in a pool, the number 
of citations increase). In order to do so, we follow the method used in the paper “Patents and 
the performance of Voluntary Standard Setting Organizations”, Rysman and Simcoe (2008).  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review 
around essentiality and patents’ value. Section 3 presents descriptive statistics of the data and 
explains the collection process of these data. Section 4 deals with the citation age profile of 
control and pool patents. Section 5 deals with the marginal effect and intrinsinc value effect of 
the patent introduction in a pool. Section 6 discuss and analyze the link between the patent 
disclosure in an SSO and the selection by a pool.  
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2.  Litterature review: what is a standard and an essential patent ?  
 
The standardization can be defined as the creation of a common and documented repository to 
harmonize the activities of a sector. Standardization is conducted by formal or informal 
standardization bodies such as consortias or standard developing organizations. The creation 
of a technological standard has many advantages for the consumer. The standardization 
allows consumers to benefit inter alia from network effects. The creation of standards can also 
engender adverse effects such as reducing the consumers’ choice or enhancing a firm market 
power. A pool is sometimes constituted after the creation of a technology. The pool includes 
patents essential to the dissemination of technology and allows user to sign only a single 
license for all pool patents. A patent holder may choose to bring or not its patent to the pool. 
The patent holders have, in practice, little incentive to bring their patents to the pool. The 
pools are constituted by patent holders or by pool administrators such as MPEG LA or Sisvel 
whose principal business is the creation and administration of pools.   
 
The only criterion for introducing a patent in a pool is the essentiality. In order to be 
introduced in a pool, a patent has to be essential to the standard. Gilbert (2009) states that 
there are two main interpretations of the “essentiality” criteria. The definition and debates 
around the definition of essentiality goes beyond the scope of this paper and we will only 
present the core definition. The technical essentiality considered as essential any patent that 
has no close substitutes or substitutes so inferior that makes them very distant alternatives. 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) in the 1997 business review letter for the MPEG 2 patent 
pool has adopted this interpretation: “there is no technical alternative to any of the portfolio 
patents within the standard”. In order to ensure the essentiality of the patents, pools usually 
have a third party evaluator that establishes essentiality reports. This third party evaluator is 
either an individual patent expert or a panel.  
 
In practice, it is difficult to precisely identify all the essential patents related to a technology. 
Indeed, all pool patents are essential but all essential patents are not in the pool. Another 
possible approach would be to use the lists of patents declared as essential in the Standard 
Setting Organizations. Indeed, many Standard Setting Organizations require their members to 
make public any patent which may be essential to a standard. Howewer, these lists contain 
patents that should not really be essential because no controls are conducted and all patent 
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holders do not disclose their patents in SSOs so these lists are not exhaustive and partially 
wrong. The following graph summarizes the situation. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In their article (2008), Rysman and Simcoe studied the effect of patents’ disclosure into 
Standard Setting Organizations (hereafter SSOs). They show that patents disclosed in SSOs, 
and then declared as essentials, receive more cites than other patents with the same 
characteristics (application year, citing year and technology class) and receive their citations 
later. They highlight that SSOs identify and endorse important technologies and that the 
disclosure of a patent in an SSO significantly increase the number of citations. They estimate 
that this marginal effect of disclosure accounts for roughly 20% of the difference in citation 
rates between SSO and control patents. They use patents declared as essential as a sample of 
essential patents.  
 
In this article we will work on pool patents consisting of patents declared as essential and 
essential patents not disclosed. We will compare them to non essential patents with the same 
characteristics. We will also work on the link between pool patents and SSO patents comparing 
essential patents to patents declared as essential. For pool patents, the “induced value” effect 
can be a way to assess the legal and economic strengthening of the patents. Indeed, as stated in 
the introduction, the patent introduction in a pool is a way to “reinforce” the patent that can not 
be circumvented anymore. This strengthening of patents by introduction into a pool is almost 
unexplored in the economic literature but confirmed by discussions with professionals. 
 
 
 
Patents 
declared 
as 
essential
Essential 
patents 
Pool 
patents 
Patents 
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In order to assess the value of patents, we will use the patents’ number of citations. The 
patents’ number of citations is one of the measures in order to assess the economic and 
technological significance of a patent. These citations allow to identify prior art for an 
invention and thus are carefully controlled by patent offices because they help to define the 
claims’ scope of the patent. For example, Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2008) in their empirical 
assessment of patent pools use forward cites as an indicator of patent value.  
 
Rysman and Simcoe (2008) in their article dedicated to patents within Standard Setting 
Organizations also use patent citations as an indicator of value. Harhoff and all. (1999) 
highlighted a positive correlation between the number of citations and a subjective estimate of 
patents’ value determined by patent holders. Hall and all. (2005) show that cited patents are 
more correlated with the patent holders’ market value than non cited patents. Giummo (2003) 
highlights, on a sample of german patents, that patents with more citations generate more 
royalties and thus that the citations could be an indicator of the economic value of patents. 
Given the literature on cites, we can therefore affirm that the link between patents’ economic 
value and number of cites has been proved. Nevertheless, a further dicussion on the relevance 
of this indicator to assess the economic and technological significance of a patent goes 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
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3. The data 
 
We work with 1363 patents from 9 pools. We choose these pools because they publish online 
their list of essential patents. All these pools are administered by MPEG LA‡ or Sisvel§. This 
necessarily generates sample selection bias because these pools are all quite large and only 
partly reflects an average pool. Today, pools are generally created and managed by 
companies holding patents or by specialized firms whose business is the management of pools 
such as MPEG LA and Sisvel. The data were collected in july 2009. Table 1 presents the 
number of patents per pool: 
 
Pool 
Number of 
patents 
Number of 
american patents 
Percentage of american 
patents in the pool 
1394 104 62 59.62% 
ATSC 50 31 62.00% 
AVC 311 60 19.29% 
MPEG 4 SYSTEMS 13 7 53.85% 
MPEG 4 VISUAL 366 123 33.61% 
MPEG AUDIO 102 15 14.71% 
MPEG-2 149 90 60.40% 
MPEG-2 Systems 27 19 70.37% 
VC-1 241 60 24.90% 
Total 1,363 467 34.26% 
 
Table 1 : Pool patents 
 
 
In order to obtain the number of citations for a patent, we connect the patents of our pool 
database to the 1976/2006 U.S. patents database available online using the patent number. 
This operation allows us to obtain a valuation of the patents’ value of each U.S. patent. 
Nevertheless, this operation also creates an important selection bias for our sample. Table 1 
presents the number of U.S. patents in each pool. Graph 1 highlights the application years for 
these 467 patents. As we can see, the majority of these applications date from the 1990s.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
‡ http://www.mpegla.com/index1.cfm 
§ http://www.sisvel.com/english 
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Graph 1 presents the percentage of patents per technology class based on the U.S patent 
classes as of 31 december 1999**. All the patents of our pool database are related to High 
Technology because of our pools’ choice.  
 
Number of patents / technological class
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Graph 1 : Number of patents / technological class 
 
 
In order to analyze the pool patents, we created a control database with patents from the 
NBER database having the same characteristics (application year and technology class) than 
the pool patents.  
 
It is very important to create a control database with patents having the same characteristics 
than the patents analyzed because the number of cites could vary based on these 
characteristics (application year or cohort effect, technology class…). We also constituted a 
“matched control” sample based on a randomly selected one to one match (the joint 
distribution of application year and technology class is identical to the pool sample). The 
sample matched control presents the same characteristics than the pool sample from which we 
removed all the duplicate patents. This should allow us to identify patents with close 
characteristics to pool patents and therefore explain the citations difference by the presence in 
the pool. Hereafter are the main characteristics of each sample. The sample “all controls” is 
constituted by all the patents with the same characteristics included in the 1976/2006 NBER 
U.S. patents database. The number of citations corrected allnscites represents the patents’ 
number of citations minus the citations made by the patent holder on its own patents. 
 
                                                 
** http://www.nber.org/patents/list_of_classes.txt 
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Patent pool sample Patent Pool sample 
without duplicates 
Matched 
controls All controls
NBER 
patents 
Number of observations 467 383 382 135370 3209376 
Mean Allcites 25.188 26.007 16.925 20.693 11.781 
Mean Allnscites 21.457 22.006 15.641 19.056 10.946 
Application Year 1996.465 1996.731 1996.736 1996.5 1992.094 
Age since grant  7.154 6.893 6.38744 6.480 11.766 
Cites/year 3.680 3.878 3.270 3.193 1.762 
Number of claims 17.161 17.744 17.301 17.709 12.083 
 
Table 2: Samples presentation 
 
 
The pool patents seem to receive more citations than other patents from the control database. 
The average number of citations per year is higher for pool patents than for matched control 
patents and therefore also for all control patents. We can also check with the number of claims 
which is also sometimes used as an indicator of value than pool patents seem to be of better 
value than other NBER patents. Howewer, although this ascertainment is useful, it is more 
interesting for our research to have a closer look at the citation age profile of the pool patents 
in order to highlight if these patents are usually cited earlier or later than the control patents.  
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4.  Citation age profile 
 
To get a first idea of the citation age profile, we look at the average citation age; conditionnal 
on patent age. This citation age profile can be highlighted by the graph 2 for the pool and the 
control sample. The same graph is available in annex for the biggest pool, the 1394 pool. On 
these graphs we can see that pool patents receive more citations than control patents. The 
other important information in this graph is that pool patents receive in general their citations 
later than the control patents. This finding is interesting because it could mean that these late 
citations are triggered by an event that does not affect control patents such as the inclusion in 
a pool.  
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Graph 2 : Citation age profile all pools 
 
To explain the differences in the citation age profile between the control patents and the pool 
patents, we also employ the method developed by Mehta, Rysman, Simcoe (2008) using a full 
set of application, citing year and technology class effect to control for various cofounding 
factors. This new method makes the asumption that the citation age process begins when the 
patent is granted by the patent office and not at the date of application. The patent age is, in 
this case, defined by the difference between the citing year and the grant year of the patent. 
This method allow to control in the same regression for the birth year effect, the age effect 
and the citation year effect and overcomes the collinearity between these three effects. To do 
this, the lag between application and grand year is used as as source of exogeneous variation.   
We will not discuss this assumption in this paper but for a better understanding of this 
hypothesis, you can refer to Mehta, Rysman, Simcoe who examine the potential bias if this 
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surmise is incorrect and test their method by reexamining prior results††. The details for the 
regression made and a table of coefficients are available in annex 1. Howewer, it is difficult to 
make predictions on the shape of the age distribution based on these coefficients, we use 
predictions conditionnal on age to obtain an average citation age for the control sample and 
the patent pool sample. Then, we compare these results to the results based on raw data. Table 
3 summarizes these results for the pool and control sample. 
 
 Raw data Estimations 
Patent pool database 2.46 (0.05) 4.10 
Control database 1.70 (0.06) 2.01 
Standard error in parentheses 
 
Table 3: Average citation age 
 
As we can see on the above table, the average citation age of pool patents is higher than the 
average citation age of the control sample. This confirms that pools patents receive their 
citations later than control patents. This result appears clearly on graph 3 that shows the 
predicted cites flows for pool and control database.  
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Graph 3 : Predicted cites flows 
 
This first part of our research shows that pool patents receive more citations than control 
patents and have a different citation age profile, receive citations later. We will now work on 
the effects of patent pools in order to separate the induced value effect of the intrinsinc value 
effect. 
                                                 
†† For a discussion of this hypothesis, see : Mehta, Rysman, Simcoe, «Identifying the age profile of patent 
citations», Journal of Applied Econometrics 
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5. The pools’ effect 
 
In this part, we will analyze the link between the patents’ citations and the patent pool in order 
to differentiate between the intrinsinc and the induced value effect. Indeed, the precedent part 
shows that pool patents receive more citations than control patents and receive their citations 
later. But this situation can arise from several effects. The number of citations can increase 
because the patent is incorporated in a pool or the pool can select patents with a higher 
number of citations. The aim of this part is to answer the following question : Are patents 
selected because they are more cited or are they more cited because they are selected ? 
 
It would be obviously impossible to establish a causal interpretation of our results because we 
can not reject the hypothesis that the pools’ selection is correlated with another unobserved 
variable that causes citations. In order to test our hypotheses, we will work with two different 
methods that will give close results. First of all, we identify the date of creation of our pools. 
Our pools were created between 1997 and 2007. In some cases, to avoid a truncation problem 
(because we only have the citations until 2006), we will work on pools created before or 
during the year 2003.  
 
5.1 The pools’ marginal effect 
 
The first method is based on the pool sample. The aim is to study induced value effect of the 
patents’ introduction in the pool. In order to do so, we will work on a panel database of pool 
patents and control for the introduction in the pool through a dummy “patent pool 
introduction”. Then, we estimate a poisson model on the pool sample with the following 
specifications: 
( , , , , )PPpy py a y p pyC f ! " # $ %&       [1] 
With : 
pyC = Number of citations for a patent p at year y  
PP
py! = Post declaration dummy  
a" = Patent age effect 
p$ = Patent fixed effect  
y#  = Truncation effect 
()f  : is a poisson process 
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The main results are presented in the following table. We also present the most significant 
results per pool. For this regression, we eliminated the pools that were created after 2003 due 
to our lack of information on citations after 2006. 
 
Allcites 
Patent pool 
sample 
Pool sample with 
pools created before 
or in 2003 
Pool sample with 
pools created before 
2003 
Pool sample with 
pools created before 
2002 
Model 1 : Induced value effect starts at disclosure year (N=1551) 
 0.3052***  0.3430***  0.3540***   0.4990***  Induced 
value effect (0.073) (0.075) (0.091) (0.105) 
 0.2085***   0.2002***    0.1860***    0.1886***  Patent age 
effect (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.026) 
-0.5619***   -0.5619***    -0.5327***   -0.5445***  Truncation 
effect (0.021) (0.022) (0.028) (0.034) 
Model 2 :Induced value effect starts at disclosure year – 2 (N=1551) 
 0.2215**   0.2563***   0.4711***  0.8103***  Induced 
value effect (0.072) (0.073) (0.09) (0.131) 
0.2062***    0.1968***  0.1555***   0.0998**    Patent age 
effect (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.034) 
-0.5487***   -0.5459***   -0.4901***   -0.4099***  Citing Year 
effect (0.021) (0.022) (0.027) (0.04) 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Standard error in parentheses. Results based on the fixed 
effect poisson specification in equation 1.  
 
Table 4 : Equation 1 results 
 
 
These results show that the induced value effect requires further analysis and can not be 
interpreted at a first sight. First of all, we have to manage issues related to our data especially 
the pools’ age because most of our pools are recent. In order to do that, we made several 
regressions separating the aggregate sample, a sample with all pools created in or before 
2003, a sample with all pools created strictly before 2003, a sample with all pools created 
strictly before 2002. As we can see the coefficients are higher when we only take into account 
older pools such as pools created in 1997 or 1999. In this case, the induced value effect with a 
coefficient of 0.4990 seems important and significant. We also control for a “pre-disclosure” 
effect in order to check for the possibility that patents have been made public before the 
creation date of the patent pool. In order to do that, we artifically advanced the date of 
disclosure by two years and compare the results with the standard model. As we can see in 
table 5, that seems to have an effect on all sample, results for the second model are in general 
higher than for the model 1.  
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If we take into account all the sample except pools with a creation date equal to 2006 or 2007 
(due to our data on citations), we can say that the patent introduction in a pool increase the 
number of citations from around 35% to around 50%. To conclude, we can say that the 
induced value effect is positive and significant.  
 
5.2 The intrinsinc and induced value effects 
 
In order to make the comparison with the induced value effect, we will work on a cross-
sectional regression with the entire sample including both the pool and the control patents. 
The aim of this approach is to compare the two effects; we will therefore introduce a dummy 
for the patents’ presence in the pool and keep the dummies “disclosure” of the precedent 
regression. We also control for the application year, technology class and age effects. We 
estimate the following poisson regression on cross-sectional data: 
 
.
,( , , , , , )
disc Sel
p y c a y pyC f ! " ' ( ) * %&        [2] 
With : 
 
C = Number of citations for a patent p  
disc! = Post declaration dummy / patent 
.Sel
p" = Selection dummy (1 if selected, 0 
otherwise) 
y' = Application year effect 
c( = Technology class effect 
a) = Age effect 
,y*  = Citing year effect 
()f  : is a poisson process 
 
 
The results of this regression are: 
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Number of citations Matched control sample (N=782) 
Matched control sample with pools 
created before or in 2003 (N=507)  
Model 1 : Control for application year and technology class  
0.5268*** 0.2162 
Intrinsinc value effect (0.131) (0.118) 
-0.2948 0.7710*** 
Induced value effect (0.157) (0.132) 
Application year effect Y Y 
Technology class effect Y Y 
Model 2 : Control for application year, technology class and patent age 
0.4473*** 0.3246* 
Intrinsinc value effect (0.124) (0.139) 
-0.039 0.3971** 
Induced value effect (0.138) (0.151) 
Application year effect Y Y 
Technology class effect Y Y 
Patent age effect Y Y 
Model 3 : Control for application year, technology class, citing year and patent age 
 0.4592***   0.3427* 
Intrinsinc value effect (0.123) (0.136) 
-0.0508 0.3602* 
Induced value effect (0.137) (0.142) 
Application year effect Y Y 
Technology class effect Y Y 
Patent age effect Y Y 
Citing year effect Y Y 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Robust standard error in parentheses. Results based on the 
poisson specification in equation 2.  
 
Table 5 : Equation 2 results 
 
We can see that the results for the matched control sample appear to be different from our 
previous findings on the induced value effect. Indeed, the induced value effect seems to have a 
negative impact on the number of citations. If we correct the sample and take only into account 
the pools with a creation date inferior or equal to 2003, the results seem consistent with our 
previous findings. The pool intrinsinc value effect has a positive and very significant coefficient 
and the induced value effect is still positive and significant but lower than in our previous 
findings. Our findings suggest that the intrinsinc value effect is almost as large as the induced 
value effect at 0.3427 and 0.3602 if we take into account this sample. Thus, our results indicate 
that around 50% of the difference in the number of citations between the pool and the control 
patents is due to the intrinsinc value effect and around 50% is due to the induced value effect.  
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6. The link between patent pools and Standard Setting Organizations 
 
Patent pools are created after the standardization of a technology. Thus, a patent usually is 
disclosed first in a Standard Setting Organization and then introduced in a pool. 
Consequently, we have to analyze the impact of the link between SSOs and patent pools on 
the number of citations. Indeed, Rysman & Simcoe (2008) show that patent disclosure into a 
Standard Setting Organization increases the patents number of citations by around 35/40%. 
Thus, it could be argued that the higher number of citations of pool patents is a consequence 
of the patent disclosure in the Standard Setting Organization. The link between SSO and pool 
patents could be an interesting argument to explain the pools intrinsinc value effect because of 
the SSO disclosure effect. The assumption behind this idea would be than pool patents are all 
previously disclosed in an SSO and then subject to an increase in their number of citations 
due to this disclosure. 
 
First of all, we have to discuss the possibility to link pool patents to SSO patents. This link is 
very difficult to establish because SSO patent disclosures are often very vague (the patent 
number or title is not always given…). In order to do that, we link the database available 
online at www.ssopatents.org to our pool database. This allows us identifying 25 patents in 
our database that were previously disclosed in an SSO. We also control directly for the AVC 
project if some patents are both pool and SSO patents. The result is surprising : only 29 
american patents were disclosed in the SSO disclosure database (complete disclosure with 
patent number…) and none of them are included in the pool. In order to control for the link 
between pools and SSO patents and given the difficulties explained above, we use the 
following method. We run the same regression than in equation2 adding a dummy for patents 
held by firms disclosing in the dedicated SSO. 
 
Another problem could be related to the use of cites in a standardization context. Indeed, 
Lampe & Moser (2009) show evidence of strategic patent files and highlight that the creation 
of a pool increase the number of patent filing. Baron & Delcamp (2010) show that patents 
included late in patent pools are more focused on the standard than patents included at the 
beginning of the pool creation process. Thus, if the creation of a pool increase the number of 
patent files on the technological area concerned, it could be problematic to use the number of 
cites as an indicator of patents’ value.  
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Indeed, it would be quite normal in this case to find a higher number of cites for pool patents 
than for non pool patents of the same technological class. The difference in this case could not 
be explained by a difference in value but only by the increase in the number of patent files 
and therefore by an increase in citations between pool patents. In order to manage this 
potential problem on cites, in this part, we run all our regressions both on all citations and 
external cites. The number of external cites can be defined as the number of forward cites that 
are not self cites or that does not come from patents in the same pool. Using external cites 
instead of the number of cites (excluding self cites) should resolve the problem of citations in 
a standardization context.   
 
6.1  Identification of SSO patents 
 
The aim of this method is to control if the pool intrinsinc value effect is still positive and 
significant when we take into account the patents earlier disclosed in an SSO. As we already 
explained in the precedent subsection, it is almost impossible to link directly patent 
disclosures in Standard Setting Organizations and pool patents. To try to circumvent this 
problem, we use in this section a dummy for pool patents held by firms that make disclosures 
in the dedicated SSO making the hypothesis that a firm can not disclose only a part of its 
patent portfolio to an SSO.  
 
This means that we make the assumption that a firm disclosing its patents in an SSO discloses 
its entire portfolio and not just some patents. With this method, we identified 229 patents (out 
of 417 in our pool sample) that may have been subject of a disclosure. Afterward, we run the 
same regression than in equation 3. We perform the regression on the entire pool sample and 
not only on pools created before 2003 because we are no longer interested in analyzing the 
induced value effect. Therefore, the induced value effect coefficients will not be interpreted in 
the results. Then, we estimate the following poisson regression : 
 
 
.
, ,( , , , , )
Sel
p y c a y p pyC f " ' ( ) * $ %&        [3] 
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With : 
C = Number of citations for a patent p 
.Sel
p" = Selection dummy (1 if selected, 0 
otherwise) 
y' = Application year effect 
c( = Technology class effect 
a) = Patent age effect 
,y*  = Citing year effect 
p$ = SSO presence dummy 
()f  : is a poisson process 
 
The results of this regression are : 
 
Number of citations  
Matched control sample (N=782) 
Matched control sample 
Allnscites 
Matched control sample 
external cites 
0.40246**   0.42619* 
Intrinsinc value effect (0.151) (0.183) 
0.14036 0.06575 
Induced value effect (0.157) 0.176 
-0.19056   -0.29660* 
Disclosure SSO dummy (0.127) 0.137 
Application year effect Y Y 
Technology class effect Y Y 
Patent age effect Y Y 
Citing year effect Y Y 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Robust standard error in parentheses. Results based on the poisson 
specification in equation 3.  
 
Table 6 : Equation 3 results 
 
We can see that the pool intrinsinc value effect is still positive and significant even if the 
results are lower and less significant than for the precedent regression. The results of this 
regression are interesting because this mean that even when we control for the SSO induced 
value effect, the pool patents are still of better value than our control sample.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this article, we compare the value of patents introduced in a pool to patents with the same 
characteristics (application year, technology class…) not included. We succesively analyzed 
the induced value effect of the introduction and then, simultaneously, the intrinsinc and the 
induced value effect. We also discuss and analyze the link between the marginal effect, on the 
number of citations, of patents disclosed in an SSO and the pool intrinsinc value effect. Our 
results show that the patents’ introduction in a pool increase the number of cites (induced 
value effect) but also that pools, in general, select patents with a higher number of citations 
(intrinsinc value effect). The induced value effect is as important as the intrinsinc value effect 
on the number of citations.  When we take into account, the possible link between Standard 
Setting Organizations and patent pools, these results seem remain robust.  
 
Indeed, when we take into account the SSO disclosure effect on the patent number of cites, 
the previous results showing that pools select patents receiving more citations remains true 
under our assumption that a firm can not disclose only a part of its patent portfolio to an SSO. 
So, we can say that pool patents have a higher intrinsinc value than patents with similar 
characteristics not included in a pool.  
 
These results are important in the current debate about the pools and their economic 
efficiency. Indeed, they show that although the term of essentiality is not directly related to 
patents’ value and therefore to the number of citations, patents selected by pools are generally 
of better value than similar patents not incorporated in a pool. It shows that essential patents 
are generally of better value based on the number of citations. This also seems to prove that 
pools are not used to dismiss poor values’ patents that could therefore have a negative impact 
for consumers on the downstream market.   
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Annex 1 : Citation age profile 
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Graph 4 : Citation Age Profile for the 1394 pool 
 
 
We estimate a citation age profile based on the following model : 
 
 ,( , , , , )
PP cp
py y c y a a pyC f ! " * $ ' %&         [4] 
With :  
pyC  : Number of citations for the patent p 
at year y 
y!  : Application year effect 
c"  : Technology class effect 
,y*  : Citing year effect 
PP
a$  : Age effect for the patent pool 
patents 
cp
a'  : Age effect for the control patents 
()f  : is a poisson process 
 
We consider that the age effects could be different in the two samples but the technology 
class, citing year and application year effects identical. We estimate this equation on the 
patent pool and control sample. The results are presented in the table 7. In order to control for 
the truncation of our sample, we stop our analysis to patents with an application year earlier 
than 2002. These coefficients seem to confirm that there is a difference in the age effect 
between the pool sample and the control sample.  
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Age Control patents Pool patents 
-3 0.23 0.23 
-2 0.76 0.41 
-1 1.52 1.46 
0 1.62 2.43 
1 2.03 3.04 
2 1.81 2.72 
3 1.45 2.88 
4 0.73 2.02 
5 0.79 1.50 
6 0.27 1.16 
7 0.34 0.86 
8 0.43 0.85 
9 0.50 0.83 
10 0.41 0.57 
11 0.26 0.75 
12 0.09 0.39 
13 0.27 0.27 
 
Table 7: Age effect for the pool and control patents 
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Annex 2 : Regressions results with Negative Binomial 
 
 
 
Allcites 
Patent pool 
sample 
Pool sample with 
pools created before 
or in 2003 
Pool sample with 
pools created 
before 2003 
Pool sample with 
pools created before 
2002 
Model 1 : Induced value effect starts at disclosure year (N=1551) 
0.04361 0.19567 0.20934  0.34124*  Induced 
value effect (0.101) (0.127) (0.131) (0.154) 
 0.16417***   0.14806*** 0.14770***  0.16843*** Patent age 
effect (0.016) (0.020) )0.021) (0.029) 
-0.49145383***  -0.49727***  -0.49119*** -0.52308***  Truncation 
effect (0.026) (0.033) (0.035) (0.041) 
Model 2 :Induced value effect starts at disclosure year – 2 (N=1551) 
0.08819 0.41512***  0.50442***   0.72311*** Induced 
value effect (0.093) (0.118) (0.124) (0.168) 
 0.16152***  0.13020*** 0.12380***  0.12194*** Patent age 
effect (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.031) 
-0.49147*** -0.49293*** -0.48400***  -0.46675*** Truncation 
effect (0.025) (0.031) (0.033) (0.041) 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Standard error in parentheses. Results based on the fixed 
effect poisson specification in equation 1.  
 
Table 8 : Equation 1 results with negative binomial 
 
 
 
Number of citations 
Matched control sample 
(N=782)  
Matched control sample with pools 
created before or in 2003 (N=507)  
0.37490***  0.30942* 
Intrinsinc value effect (0.104) (0.128) 
-0.05079 0.33393* 
Induced value effect (0.130) (0.142) 
Application year effect Y Y 
Technology class effect Y Y 
Patent age effect Y Y 
Citing year effect Y Y 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Robust standard error in parentheses. Results based 
on the poisson specification in equation 2.  
 
Table 9 : Equation 2 results using negative binomial 
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Number of citations  
Matched control sample (N=782) 
Allnscites 
Matched control 
sample 
External cites 
Matched control 
sample 
0.32699* 0.41391**   
Intrinsinc value effect -0.132 -0.133 
0.20576 0.27254* 
Induced value effect -0.13 -0.132 
-0.07768 -0.13424 
Disclosure SSO dummy -0.125 -0.122 
Application year effect Y Y 
Technology class effect Y Y 
Patent age effect Y Y 
Citing year effect Y Y 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
Results based on the poisson specification in equation 3.  
 
Table 10 : Equation 3 results using negative binomial 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
